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TAX SHARING AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
DANIEL D. ROSTENKOWSKI*
HEN

I was invited to contribute an article which would be

meaningful to this dialogue on the possible Illinois Constitutional Convention, my thoughts raced immediately to the
problems which tax sharing could bring in the event it is enacted. Tax
sharing is the payment back to the states of a certain percentage of
federal income tax revenues. The theory is that these payments would
be carved from a predicted budget surplus. At a time when the anticipated budget deficit for fiscal 1968 approaches $21.6 billion and the
anticipated deficit for 1969 is expected to run about $24.7 billion,' the
possibility that this theory will come into being, for the moment seems
remote.
In writing this paper, I want to emphasize that I am taking the
position of a stakeholder, an innocent observer, or, if you like, a virtual
Surveyor satellite attempting to relay back to Illinois the strange impulses which impinge upon the lunar surface of Capitol Hill. I do not
intend by this discussion to either endorse or foreclose a change in the
tax policies of Illinois. My one and only purpose is to raise the problems and suggest arguments for and against taking action.
Tax sharing is not a new concept. It appeared in this country during
the presidency of Andrew Jackson. At that time, a large federal surplus
had accumulated as a result of the substantial revenues received from
the sale of public lands and customs receipts. The public debt, marvelous to relate, had been wiped out and accordingly Congress passed the
Surplus Distribution Act of 1836 which provided for distribution to
the states on an unconditional basis.2 Over many years, in addition
* MR. RosTEnKowsKI is a member of the P0th Congress and has served continuously
since the 86th Congress as Representative from the Eighth Congressional District of Illinois. He is Chairman of the House Democratic Caucus and is a member of the House
Ways and Means Committee. Prior to his service as a United States Representative, he
served as State Representative in the 68th General Assembly, Illinois and as State Senator
in the 69th and 70th General Assemblies, Illinois.
1 Hearings before the House Comm. on Ways and Means on the President's Surtax
Proposal, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 61 (1968).
2 5 Stat. 52, 55 (1846).
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to the Surplus Distribution Act, the United States government has
shared some percentage of revenues derived from the sale of federal
public lands, grazing leases and permits and the use of national grassland, with state and local governments. Canada,' Australia, West
Germany and Argentina presently have varying arrangements for
sharing tax revenues with their local governing bodies.4
While not a new idea, there has been a great amount of pressure
over the last few years for legislation in this area. During the 89th
Congress, fifty-seven legislators sponsored or co-sponsored fifty-one
tax sharing bills.' Both political parties have been involved in this
legislation with the Democratic party presently not as deeply committed as the Republican party. Since it was originally a Democratic
party idea, it takes on the status of a non-partisan area.
One of the leading proponents of tax sharing is Dr. Walter W.
Heller, former Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisors during the Kennedy Administration. Dr. Heller proposed his
formula in 1960, but no serious consideration was given to it until
1964. With the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1964, the Administra3 Federal-Provincial Tax-Sharing Arrangements Act of 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. II, c.29 (Can.).
4 As a brief example, the Dominion of Canada has had various tax sharing provisions
with regard to the Provinces for a number of years. Originally, the Minister of Finance
was authorized to pay to a Province a sum which, when added to the standard taxes of
the Province, would cause the per capita revenue production of that Province to equal
the per capita revenue production of the two leading Provinces for that year. In addition to tax equalization payments, there was also a provision for payment to the
Provinces of revenue stabilization payments, i.e., the amount by which tax equalization
payments were exceeded by tax rental payments and basic stabilization payments. Tax
rental payments were made to the Provinces by the Minister, where agreements had
been made between the Provinces and the Canadian Government, in which the Canadian
Government would collect the revenues and give the Province its share, eliminating the
necessity for the Province to collect individual and corporate income taxes, and estate
and gift taxes through a separate tax collection procedure.
The provisions above were applicable to the period from April 1, 1957 to March 31,
1962. The present law, The Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act of 1967, 14, 15
& 16 Eliz. II, c. 89 (Can.), proposes a similar form of sharing with stress on tax equalization and provincial stabilization payments. Instead of the tax rental payments, the
Provinces and the Canadian Government have adopted a form of tax collection agreement
which provides, in part, for the following:
Canada, as agent of the Province, will collect for and on behalf of the Province the
income taxes imposed under the provincial act for each of the years comprising the term
of this agreement and remit amounts in respect thereof to the Province in accordance with
this agreement. . ..
The Province will, in respect of each year during the term, impose income tax under
the provincial act in the following manner: . . .
(2) In imposing income tax ... the Province will, in respect of each year, impose only
one rate of individual income tax and one rate of corporation income tax.
5 Digest of Public General Bills and Resolutions, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1966).
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tion's feelings were sanguine as to the impetus that tax reductions
would give to the economy. The prospects of achieving a budget surplus
looked just over the horizon.' The Democratic party platform for the
1964 campaign contained a provision for tax sharing so as to assist
state and local governments. During the Presidential campaign of
1964, both candidates expressed support for some form of tax sharing.
The plan of Dr. Heller can be stated briefly as being a setting aside
by the federal government of between one to two percent of the individual federal income tax base. 7 The sums collected for the states
would be placed in a trust fund and periodic distributions would be
made to the states on the basis of population. The states would be
given a "no strings attached" distribution because the very purpose
of revenue sharing is to enlarge the states' area of fiscal discretion.
Because there is a possibility of the states reducing taxes in the face
of receiving shared revenue, the plan suggests reduction of revenue
vis-4-vis any state tax reduction.
In today's economy, the national growth increases revenues by
$8 to $9 billion per year without the necessity of raising taxes. State
and local government growth is only about half of this figure. On the
other side of the coin, while the state and local growth rate goes on
at half that of the national, its expenditure rate for services is rising
sharply, while the federal rate, but for Viet Nam, is declining. A budget
surplus is predicted at the federal level when and if there is a denouement of the Viet Nam crisis. If a surplus does develop, a "fiscal drag"
will occur wherein demand will consist more of investment and less of
consumption.' Under this surplus condition there may be the possibility that our economy will be depressed. While a depression is not
the necessary corollary of "fiscal drag," the thinking in tax sharing
circles is that it would be far better to share this surplus with the
states, thereby lessening the chance of depression.
6 HELLER, NEW DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY ch. III (1966).
7 STAFF OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY, 90TH CONG., IST
SESS., REPORT ON REVENUE SHARING AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 750 (Joint Comm. Print Vol.

111967).
8 Hearings before House Comm. on Ways and Means on the President's Surtax Proposal, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 155 (1968).
9 McBreen, Federal Tax Sharing: Historical Development and Arguments for and
against Recent Proposals, in STAFF OF JOINT ECONOMIC Comm., SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL
POLICY, 90TH CONG., lST SEss., REPORT ON REVENUE SHARING AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 724

(Joint Comm. Print Vol. II 1967).
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In the ten years from 1955 to 1965 state and local expenditures
have increased from $34 billion per annum to $75 billion, an increase
of 123%. During this same period the federal expenditures have
shown only a 55%o increase. 10 State and local taxes, though they have
risen drastically, have not kept pace with this tremendous rise in the
cost of improvements and services. The picture rounds out to an ever
expanding state and local increase in costs coupled only to regressive
state and local taxes which cannot, by the wildest stretch of the
imagination, begin to keep up with these costs.
On February 27, 1968, the Tax Foundation, Inc., reported that tax
increase proposals totaling about $1 billion are coming to a vote before
the legislatures of twenty-four states. In 1967, the new tax increases
totaled $2.5 billion.' Increases in income, sales, use, gasoline, tobacco
and liquor taxes are being sought in sixteen states. Rhode Island and
South Dakota will consider adopting personal income taxes for the
first time, and South Dakota is contemplating a tax on corporate
income. At this writing ten states do not have a corporate income
tax and fifteen have no personal income tax.
Today, almost all of the increase in revenues from the state and
local sources comes from higher property tax revenues. In many cities
and towns, property tax rates are already too high and further substantial increases in these rates are undesirable. The problem is, that
while federal taxes respond to and automatically increase with economic growth, state and local property taxes do not.
Of the fifty states, thirty-five impose an income tax. Fifteen states at
present have no income tax and of these, there are some states, Illinois
included, which are prevented from having such taxes because of
constitutional provisions. Of the states that do impose an income tax,
twelve impose a tax that amounts to less than one percent of federal
adjusted gross income, fourteen have income tax burdens of under
two percent and nine have rates over two percent to a maximum of
approximately three percent.' 2 The view among the tax sharing proponents is that since the federal government's taxing power is so
10 Pechman, Financing State and Local Government, Proceedings of a Symposium on
Federal Taxation, March 26, 1965, Washington, D.C.
11

Tax Foundation Inc., Press Release Feb. 27, 1968.

12 Heller,

Strengthening the Fiscal Base of our Federalism, in

STrAF

OF JOINT EcoNomic

Com., SUBCOmm. ON FiscAL PoLICY, 90TH CONG., lST SEss., REPORT ON REVENUE SHARING AND ITS ALTERNATIWS 756 (Joint Comm. Print Vol. II, 1967).
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superior to that of the states, the old maxim should read, "The whole
is greater than the sum of all of its parts."
ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL

BARRIERS

The people of Illinois have had two opportunities to express themselves on the Revenue Article of the 1870 Constitution through the
state-wide referendum. 3 In addition, several amendments to the
Article have been submitted to the voters in the following years:
1916,14 1926,1r 1930,16 1942,'17 1952,18 1956,1 and 1966.20 On these
occasions, a majority of those voting at the election expressed no voice
with respect to these amendments and they failed to pass. These
statistics show that it would be extremely difficult to meaningfully
change Article IX.
As the law now stands, it appears that property taxes classified by
the legislature rather than by administrative agencies, a graduated
income tax, and perhaps other types of taxes not enumerated in section
one and levied on other than an ad valorem basis, can only be achieved
by constitutional amendment modifying sections one and two of Article
IX. 2" The present restrictions might be stricken from the Constitution
altogether and the legislature given freedom to prescribe the most
expeditious and efficient method of taxation. This result could be
achieved by an amendment permitting the legislature to classify whatever category it desired. This would open up all classes of choice. The
present imminence of another Constitutional Convention calls for an
examination of Article IX to ascertain the present posture of the
state's taxing power. An adequate knowledge of what can and cannot
be done under the Illinois Constitution will give us a view of the
possible problems we might have if tax sharing comes into being.
The judicial tribunals of this state have accepted the theory that
13 1904, 1912.

14 S.J. Res. 21, ILL. SEN. J. 348 (1951).
15
16

S.J. Res. 4, ILL. SEN. J. 1126 (1925).
S.J. Res. 28, ILL. SEN. J. 1332 (1929).

17 H.J. Res. 35, ILL. H. J. 493, 643 (1941).
18 H.J. Res. 40, ILL. H. J. 1865 (1951).
19 S.J. Res. 16, ILL. SEN. J. 2485 (1955).
H.J. Res. 71, ILL. H. J. 5419 (1965).

20

21 Bachrach v. Nelson, 349 II. 579, 182 N.E. 909 (1952).
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the state has inherent power to tax. Under this theory, the specific
enumeration in a constitutional provision of certain types of taxes
should not foreclose and restrict our General Assembly just to those
specific items. But the courts have repeatedly stated that the legislature is limited to three types of taxes; property, occupation and franchise.22
Reform of the Revenue Article has been an aim of the state legislature for some time. In 1912, on a policy question submitted to
referendum, it was the will of the majority that the General Assembly
should proffer a constitutional amendment to provide for the classification of property. In 1916 an amendment was proposed which would
have excepted personal property from the ad valorem and proportionate value requirements. Under either of these proposals the legislature might have had leeway to impose an income tax. The 1916
amendment was defeated.
If there was any doubt as to the will of the people of this state on
the issue of income taxes, it was quelled in 1922 when a new constitution which included a Revenue Article that would have installed the
income tax in Illinois was submitted to the electorate. The proposed
constitution went down to an ignominious defeat."3 The antipathy of
the voters to an income tax places a property tax upon the people
which is largely an inequitable proposition.
In 1959 and 1961 there was a wide split on proposals to amend
the Revenue Article the upshot of which has been frustration. The
proposal for 195924 was to include real and tangible personal property
under the ad valorem and proportionate value area but except intangible personal property into a special class. There was also a provision for a non-graduated income tax. But although constitutional
revenue revision was held to be widely needed, the 1959 proposals
were summarily rejected in the General Assembly.
In 1961,25 the need for revision was even more pressing-so much
so that the Governor, in a message of March 28, 1961, called for the
constitutional reform of the Revenue Article. 6 The proposals follow22

Id.

28 Affirmative votes 185,298, negative votes 921,398.
24

25

ILL. SEN.

J. 630 (1959).

ILL. H. J. 56 (1961).

26 Message to a specially convened session of the 72nd General Assembly.
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ing this message were fraught with strife over the graduated income
tax. The Governor called for the demise of constitutional restrictions
upon the General Assembly's power to tax. Certain proposals offered
in the Legislature would have transferred from constitutional limitation to legislative discretion the powers to effect the necessary revenue
provisions. 7 These proposals were rejected, as were their predecessors,
and it is widely believed today that no such legislation can hope to
stand without an enabling constitutional amendment."
The state of Illinois without some form of constitutional reform
would be barred from realizing the benefits of a tax credit approach
to a share of the national revenues. A tax credit (one method of tax
sharing) is a device to prevent double taxation. The theory is that if
a single or uniform result is to take place, then the income tax charged
by one jurisdiction should be subtracted from the tax of the other
jurisdiction in order to effectively tax the individual at a single rate.
The credit differs from a deduction, which is merely an amount subtracted from gross income before applying an independent and partly
doubling tax rate to the income previously taxed.2
27 ILL. CONST. art.

IX, § 3.

28 Supra note 21.
29 A tax credit method is defined as one which would permit a straight offset of the
state taxes paid against the federal tax liability. Under the tax credit plan, if the people
received a credit directly against their federal income tax, the state would raise revenues
with no difficulty and with no added burden upon the population. In other words,
depending upon the amount of tax credit available, the state could finance almost any
expense against the revenues of the federal government. The tax credit is almost an
unlimited invitation to spend, whereas the block grant is a specific and limited amount
of money. The tax credit would prove to be more of an inducement to the state governments to increase their expenditures and at the same time would be less of an inducement to the reduction of taxes.
The tax credit should prove to be of assistance to the poor states, because the credit,
having fostered state spending, tends to work to the benefit of the needy. They would
receive more from expenditures made at the state level than from reduction of income
taxes which they are probably not required to pay in any event. Under the Heller
Plan, block'grants are to be made on the basis of population, and it is anticipated that
this would work to the detriment of small and less richly endowed states whereas the
tax credit could provide the inspiration of increased state activity.
Since the conclusion that block grants tend to reduce taxes and tax credits tend to
increase expenditures seems to be the opposite of intuitive expectation, the following
example is given to delineate the difference:
If the governor of a state had just determined that an additional $100 million in
taxes was necessary and that a cut in the budget program of $10 million was also
necessary, would the receipt of a block grant of $20 million logically cause him to add
back to that budget the $10 million program? The thinking of the experts is that if
the $10 million program which was cut was not worth the $10 million before the
grant, it would not be worth $10 million afterwards and there would be an inducement
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Under the usual tax credit plan, the taxes have to be of the same
nature. In other words, an income tax paid in one jurisdiction would
be credited against income taxes of the other. An avoidance of double
taxation could not be effected by crediting a real property tax against
an income tax because they would not duplicate one another. Property
and income being separate entities, the principle of the tax credit would
not apply. There is a proposal which would permit the crediting of
all state taxes against the federal income tax. This type of approach,
however, has heretofore not been considered proper in the tax credit
30
area.
VARIOUS APPROACHES TO TAX SHARING

The alternatives with which we are faced are shared revenue, tax
credits, direct federal operation, program grants, block grants, block
grants with an equalization feature, and negative income taxation.
Briefly, these alternatives may be described as follows:"'
(1) Shared Revenue. A fixed percentage of the federal income tax
base would be set aside and distributed to the separate states on the
basis of population, amount of state revenue production and possibly
on the basis of equalization.
(2) Tax Credits. This alternative permits a credit of state taxes
against federal income tax liability. The credit differs from a deduction
in that it would directly offset the tax rather than merely be used to
reduce taxable income to which the overall tax rates would be applied.
(3) Direct Federal Operations. Increased federal expenditures
could be made for new domestic operations which would be carried on
by the federal government in the states. The type of operation referred
to raise taxes less and not spend more. In other words, if the program cut was not
necessary, the block grant would not change that situation.
On the other hand, supposing the same circumstances but instead of a block grant the
governor received news that a tax credit plan had been voted into law, would this
change the governor's thinking? The visceral reaction is that nothing would be different.
However, assuming that the $10 million for the abandoned program could be directly
credited against federal income taxes,, the governor could then say that these projects,
which admittedly were not worth $10 million before, were a big bargain now because
the entire check would be picked up by the federal government.
3OAmerican Metal Co. v. Comm'r, 221 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1955).
31 Wiedenbaum, Federal Aid to State and Local Governments: The Policy Alternatives,
in STAFF OF JOINT EcoNomIc COmM., SUBCOMM. ON FIsCAL POLICY, 90TH CONG., IST
SESS., REPORT ON REVENUE SLAPiG AND ITS ALTERNATivEs 651 (joint Comm, Print Vol.

111967),
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to would be mass transportation or other improvement programs. The
help here would be in removing a burden which the states would otherwise have to carry.
(4) Program Grants. An increase in the number of federal programs, such as the construction of medical facilities and interstate
highways, where the federal government keeps a tight control and sets
detailed standards to be carried out by the states. It would not require direct federal operation, but again, would assist the states in
relieving much of the financial burden.
(5) Straight Block Grants. A grant which is an unconditional gift
from the federal government to the state. The thought is to set up a
permanent trust fund for distribution on a per capita basis.
(6) Block Grants with an Equalization Feature. Such grants provide for the setting up of a trust fund out of a percentage of the
federal income tax base, but instead of a distribution on the basis of
population, a certain percentage would be distributed purely on a
per capita basis and the remaining percentage on the basis of need.
In this approach, certain portions of the distribution would be determined on the basis of the tax efficiency of the state. An important
part of this approach, as in any approach in the tax sharing area,
would involve making sure that any shared revenues were properly
"passed through" to the political subdivisions of the state.
(7) The Negative Income Tax. This type of program would replace
many of our categorical welfare aids-aid to dependent children, old
age assistance, and aid to the blind and the disabled. 2 This plan would
assist individuals and families who were not on welfare but with income
below the poverty line. A negative income tax would transfer much of
the burden of welfare administration to the Internal Revenue Service.
That agency, so proficient and experienced in collecting taxes, would
be assigned the task of verifying the accuracy of low income returns
and paying out funds according to an established schedule. The negative income tax approach would relieve state and local budgets of a
substantial drain and present matching aids would be eliminated. The
financial transfer of such a major function to the national government,
it is claimed, would permit present state and local budgets to expand
in other areas without increasing taxes.
As is readily perceptible, these approaches all try to do the same
32 Statement by Clara Penniman presented at the hearings before the Joint Economic
Comm., Subcomm. on Fiscal Policy, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 32 (July 31, 1967).
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thing in more or less different ways. The important thing to remember
is that whatever approach the trail blazers in this field will use, the day
is coming in the near future when our increasing population and our
demand for the best in facilities and services at the state and local
level will force our hand."3 How soon it will come will depend upon
the states themselves. The belief that the states will not be able to
keep up with the demand for services is founded on what is termed
the states' regressive tax programs. They are regressive in that they
have, in taxing property, reached the point of diminishing returns.
Their usefulness for revenue, rather than improving the financial picture, will tend to decline rather than expand with the nation's growth
pattern.8 4
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF TAX SHARING

The primary argument for federal tax sharing with state and local
governments is the contention that the federal government has preempted the major revenue-producing source-the income tax. It is
argued that the federal government has an insurmountable advantage
over the state and local seats of authority; and during an era of economic prosperity, it will collect more than it needs to finance its own
programs. It is the contention of the experts that once the conflict in
Viet Nam is concluded and the level of federal spending is reduced,
additional tax revenues, generated by a booming economy, would
siphon off too much money from the private sector of the economy.
A federal surplus would result before full employment of manpower
and resources is achieved. A surplus could retard growth and it is feared
that "fiscal drag" could promote a recession.
While it is true that cutting taxes would reduce a budget surplus,
it is evident that the legislative process required for such a cut takes
a great deal of time and a recession could be well underway before the
President had an opportunity to sign such a bill into law. 5 Current
thought in this area is that an automatic transfer of a surplus to the
33

Supra note 10.

34 Statement by L. Laszlo Echer-Racz presented at hearings before the Joint Economic

Comm., Subcomm. on Fiscal Policy, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 36 (July 31, 1967).
35 The Tax Council, The Dialog Grows, in STAFF OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY, 90TH CONG., IST SESS., REPORT ON REVENUE SHARING AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES

1205 (Joint Comm. Print Vol. II 1967).
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states would accomplish the double good of stemming a recession and
supplying vitally needed revenues.
Advocates of this program assert that the simplicity of this proposal
makes it all the more desirable. Block grants with "no strings attached," made to state and local governments will enable them to
operate more independently, without the burden of federal controls.
Local officials will be freed from the red tape involved in meeting
stringent federal conditions which are now imposed for qualification
under existing grants-in-aid. Many of the programs now being handled
from Washington could be more effectively controlled at the state and
local level by the state personnel who are most familiar with their own
state's particular needs and who can make the best distribution of
the funds. This will not only cut down on the increase in the size and
cost of administering our federal government but it will also relieve the
federal employees from the additional details now required in handling
existing grant-in-aid programs. Mr. Paul N. Ylvisaker, Commissioner
of Community Affairs of the State of New Jersey, testified on this
point before the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic
Committee during the summer of 1967:
Still another argument for decentralizing and for moving away from what we now
have is the confounding array of present Federal grant programs. I can give you
the full horror story of what it is like to deal with 440 separate Federal programs.
This is probably the purgatory to which a former foundation official should be

assigned.3 6

The tax sharing provisions, having no federal strings attached other
than that they be fairly passed through to the political subdivisions
of the states, would be a boon to low-income areas. The strict matching
requirements now imposed by federal grant-in-aid programs make it
extremely arduous for these local governments to utilize such aid.
When they do, the outpouring of matching funds usually drains a portion of the requirements from other vital services.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST TAX SHARING

The basis for tax sharing is that the states are running far behind
in adequate revenues and the prediction is that there will be a surplus
in the federal budget. However, a study by the Tax Foundation lends
86 Statement presented at the hearings before the Joint Economic Comm., Subcomm. on
Fiscal Policy, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 42 (July 31, 1967).
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some support to the proposition that the states are not as badly off
financially as everyone seems to think. It indicates that the states
have sufficient fiscal resources to finance their projected expenditures.
The report entitled Fiscal Outlook for State and Local Government to
1975 states that, "Under the conditions assumed, aggregate general
revenues will grow somewhat more rapidly than spending in the decade
ahead, without an increase in over-all rates.""7 It estimates that general
expenditures of state and local units of government will rise from $75
billion in 1965 to $142 billion by the year 1975. This projection estimates an increase of 89% as opposed to the general consensus of an
increase of 123% between 1955 and 1965 as earlier herein set out. The
report also predicts a rise in state revenues which will be $5 billion in
excess of the anticipated expenses by the year 1975. This projection,
if true, would effectively undercut the major premise of tax sharing.
But, in addition to this serious consideration, there is a strong feeling
that any surplus we may be able to develop at the federal level could
be better used in the reduction of the national debt.
A great many federal officials feel that the answer lies in improving
our grant-in-aid programs which keep strong controls on the expenditures of these monies. It is rather widely felt that the states will not
spend these wisely or in keeping with the good order of many of our
national programs.
At the present time federal grants account for more than one fourth
of all the revenue of Illinois. For the years 1963 to 1965 Illinois received about $840 million from the federal government. For the period
8
1965-1967 federal grants to Illinois amounted to $1.089 billion. Federal aid accounts for 57.3% of the appropriations to the Department
of Public Health or $33.5 million. In the construction of highways,
federal aid accounts for 59.2% of Illinois' program. Out of $1.048
billion designated for this purpose by the state, federal grants-in-aid
for 1965-1967 totaled $620 million.
State monies in Illinois are constitutionally subject to expenditure
only by virtue of legislative appropriations. The Illinois legislature
meets every two years and adopts a biennial budget. Because federal
37 Government Finance Brief No. 7, Tax Foundation, Inc. 1 (1966).
38 Illinois Legislative Council Federal Aid: Prospects and Problems in Illinois, in
STAFF OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY, 90TH CONG., IST SESS.,
REPORT ON REVENUE SHARING AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 268-77 (Joint Comm. Print Vol. I

1967).
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grants-in-aid are allocated to Illinois on an annual basis rather than
biennially, the state is at a distinct disadvantage in determining how
much will be needed in matching funds. Since a quarter of the state's
revenue now comes via grants-in-aid, it might behoove Illinois to take
a second look at the proposition of having annual legislative sessions,
if only for the purpose of looking into budgetary considerations. Such
a constitutional amendment was submitted to the voters in 1964 but
failed to pass. 39
The difference between present grants-in-aid and the tax sharing
proposals lies in the degree of control that the federal government
retains. Whether we get tax sharing or whether we stay with the federal
grants-in-aid, we should not leave Illinois in such an inflexible position that she will suffer any loss.
It is also rather widely believed that if we go on a tax sharing program, the states may reduce their taxes and cut down on essential programs.4 ° Another apprehension is that many of the states will not pass
on the shared revenues to their political subdivisions. Allocation of the
revenues, therefore, will be utilized to the disadvantage of the majority
of citizens and failure of the federal government to exercise a degree
of control on the distribution of the funds below the state level will
foment bitter controversies in the state's tier of authority which will
be impossible to solve."
It is argued further that tax sharing, rather than having the salubrious effect which its proponents claim, will not contribute toward the
decentralization of the federal government but will make the states
more and more dependent upon it. It is the fear of many that the
federal government, already a giant in all fields, will become a colossus
from the institution of this idea.
WHAT SOLUTION SHOULD ILLINOIS SEEK WITH RESPECT
TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION?

The General Assembly of Illinois on May 16, 1967, adopted Senate
Joint Resolution No. 2 providing as follows:
39 H.J. Res. 40, ILL. H. J. 4057 (1963).
40 Hearings before the Joint Economic Comm., Subcomm. on Fiscal Policy, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., 130 (1967).
41 Hearings before the Joint Economic Comm., Subcomm. on Fiscal Policy, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., 112 (1967).
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Resolved, by the Senate of the Seventy-fifth General Assembly of the State of
Illinois, the House of Representatives concurring herein, that a convention is necessary to revise, alter or amend the Constitution of this State, and that the question of the calling of such a convention shall be submitted to the electors of this
next general election, as provided in Article XIV of the Present ConState at the
42
stitution.

The State of Illinois must weigh the factors and decide whether it
is in the type of financial condition predicted in Fiscal Outlook for
State and Local Government to 1975."8 If it is, then the Constitutional
Convention, as it pertains to the Revenue Article, will not have the
same sense of importance. If, on the other hand, the state's finances
do not project an adequate amount to cover anticipated expenditures,
it is suggested that some thought might be given to placing it within
the province of the legislature to adapt to a more flexible policy which
could take advantage of possible changes in federal use of its tax
revenues.
I know of one field already in which the State of Illinois will incur
additional expenses. Last year in the case of Johnson v. Robinson,"
brought in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, it was held that the one year residency requirement for
applicants for public assistance was unconstitutional. Similar residency
requirements were struck down in Ramos v. Health and Social Services
47
46
Board,4 5 Harrell v. Board of Commissioners, Thompson v. Shapiro,
and Green v. Department of Welfare.48
The Thompson case is presently on direct appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States and application in the Harrell case has been
made. It seems fairly obvious from the District Courts' actions in the
above cases that the Supreme Court will affirm. The removal of the
residency requirements is expected to increase the costs to Illinois by
several million dollars in the area of welfare alone.
Heller, in speaking of the ever increasing state burdens, points out:
A very large part of what we do through government is done through state and
local units. They are the ones to whom we usually turn as we seek to maintain
42

S.J. Res. 2, ILL. H. J. 47 (1967).

43 Supra note 38.
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45276 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Wis. 1967).
46269 F. Supp. 919 (D.D.C. 1967).
47 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967).

48270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967).
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and upgrade our educational efforts, improve our physical and mental health, redevelop decaying urban areas, build safer and better highways, overcome air and
water pollution, and equip our suburbs with water systems, sewers, roads, parks,
schools and the like. This list is striking partly because each item of it represents
either an essential function or a reasonable aspiration of a great and growing society; partly because each item falls squarely within the traditional sphere of
State-local operation; and partly because so many items on the list are suffused
with a national interest that transcends State and local lives ...
Meanwhile, prosperity generates demands for better schools, roads, and parks,
for new and better services. And it generates them faster than it produces added
State and local revenues. Further, the growth that confers such a bountiful harvest
of revenues on the Federal government leaves the States and their subdivisions a
bitter harvest of air and water pollution, disappearing green space and urban rot.
Truly, prosperity gives49 the National Government the affluence and the local governments the effluents.

The population of Illinois today is 10,893,00050 and by the year
1975 we anticipate that it will be 11,879,000. This growth rate, of necessity, must put more pressure on schools, on utilities and services
and administration. Will Illinois derive sufficient revenue under the
restrictions of Article IX to maintain the added million individuals?

In its report, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations set forth guidelines to assist the states in proceeding expeditiously
with property tax reform."' Article IX has withstood many efforts to

put Illinois taxing power on a more flexible basis. I am wondering
whether the time has arrived when Illinois will open the windows on

the stuffy halls of the past and place herself in a position to maneuver
should the tax sharing movement come into being.

CONCLUSION
The question of tax sharing has not wanted a forum for discussion.
As a matter of fact, it would appear that the discussion has spawned a
number of basic differences on just how the proposals, if they come
into being, should be handled. Should taxable income or actual taxes
collected be the basis for determining the amount available for distribution? Should the money be set aside in a trust fund or be subject
to annual Congressional review via the appropriation process? Should
49

50

HELLER, NEW DImENsioNs OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 121, 127 (1966).
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51 The Role of the States in Strengthening the Property Tax, in STAFF OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., SUBcOMM. ON FIsCAL POLICY, 90TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT
REVENUE SHARING AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 213 (Joint Comm. Print, Vol. I 1967).
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the funds be allocated to the states on the basis of population or allocated on the basis of the percentage of revenues derived? What weight
shall be given to state-local tax effort? What provision will be made to
pass the funds through to the political subdivisions of the states? How
much federal control and supervision will be exercised over the disbursement of these tax sharing funds? As I said before, I take no
position on this area other than to suggest that it is gaining greater
currency. It is suggested that the Revenue Article be looked into with
this possibility in mind.

